It is a hazardous fact of life that. users are hardly ever willing and able to memorise strong passworcis or long personal icientification numbers (PINs). This paper describes a variant of t.he "open key exchange" (OKE) protocol, a cryptographic scheme to provide high security eVl'1l when using low-entropy passwords. The \-ariallt has been dedicatedly designed for slow devices, such as smart. cards.
Introduction
If Alice and Bob use a strong secret key, or if one of them knows t.he other's authentic public key, standard cryptographic techniques for key agreement allow both sides to establish a session key and to use it for secure communication (i.e., to guarantee both confidentiality and authenticity of the messages). Many practical applications, however, suffer from the following problem: An authentic public key is not known, and if both sides agree on a secret key, it is a weak secret key, generated from a simple password t.o be entered by the user. 3 Since humans are quit.e bad at generating and memorising high-entropy secrets, searching for all likely (or even possible) keys -so-called dictionary attacks -is efficient and will probably reveal the secret key. Fortunately, cryptographers have started developing "password protocols" to securely authenticate and exchange spssion keys, even if the participants only have agreed on a weak key in advance. The security of such protocols depends on counting how often an attempt to establish a seclU'P connection fails. The failure may occur either because the other participant. responds "wrongly", or because no response is given at all (some "time-out" event). We describe this by a reject counter.
Here, we reconsider the Protect.ed OKE protocol from Lucks [15] . While the security assurance from the proof of security may be smaller, especially in comparison to protocols provably secure in the standard model [11, 13] , we argue that for some practical applications, only Protected OKE is efficient enough. The reason is, that the competing protocols all use either t.he Diffie-Hellman key exchange or (in the case of [13] ) the Cramer-Shoup Cryptosystem as their main cryptographic primitive. In contrast to this, Protectcd OKE uses RSA and allows the use of small fixed public exponents, such as 3. Let n be a security parameter. Given a group base g, both Diffie-Hellman and Cramer-Shoup require to compute some values gX (modulo an n-bit number). This is computationally much more expcnsive than computing x: 3 (modulo a composed n-bit number). In the case of Protected OKE, only one of the parties needs to compute the RSA-decryption operation (i.e., to compute x d for a large d). Think of an application, where one of the parties is computationally impaired, e.g. by using a slow smartcard. In this case, computing x 3 can be fast enough, even if general exponentiations are too slow.
Sometimes, even Protected OKE with the public exponent 3 may be too slow. We describe a much more efficient variant, by trading some seC'1l'rity for g1'eatly impmved efficiency.
The Security Model
In this sect.ion, we give an informal description of the security modc1. 4 The Attack Model. As mentioned above, Eve has complete control over the connection between Bob and Alice, see below. She can
• read all messages,
• modify the messages, delay them or send them multiple times,
• create any message she wants on her own and send it to Alice as "Bob's message" and to Bob as a message seemingly from Alice.
We consider protocols for the authenticated key e:rchange (Jar weak keys) between Alice and Bob. Such a protocol is sound, if both partners accept with overwhelming probability, assuming each message from Alice to Bob and each message from Bob to Alice is faithfully transmitted.
Both Alice and Bob can either send a reply, or accept the communication and create a session key, or reject the communication. They reject, if they either find out that a reply they get is "wrong", or if a connection is timed out when they are waiting for a reply. So, in order to avoid being rejected, Eve must give "correct" replies.
Eve's target is to learn a session key, which has been accepted by either Alice or Bob or both of them.
The Reject Counter. We assume that both Alice and Bob willllot continue any communication after a fixedllumber R of rejections. 5 The number of allowed rejections is crucial for Eve's probability of success. If the initial probability to guess the right password is ::; (7, The group operation needs to be compatible with the encryption func-
. Also, the encryption fUllction must be invertible, i.e. D(E(x)) = x must hold for x ESE. The group SE can depend on the choice of E, as for RSA. The pair (E,D) and hence the group S E can be chosen once by Alice and remains fixed during the experiment of running the protocol in the presence of Eve.
D is kept secret. We use "I" to indicate the concatenation of bit strings.
Protocol Description
The generic OKE protocol works like this [15] 
Alice rejects if t i-h3 (a'
). Else, she uses k' = h2 (a') as session key.
Security Theorem
We make the following two cryptographic assumptions: 
When RSA comes into play
At a first look, the RSA public-key cryptosystem appears to be ideal for open key exchange. The public key is the pair E = (e, N), where N = PQ is the product of two huge primes P and Q and e is relatively 
A Security Problem
Note that the function E must be invertible. We had required this above.
This property is actually used in the proof of security [15] . If Eve, when impersonating Alice, chooses E sllch that it is not invertible, i.e., no function D exists at all, Theorem 1 is no longer applicable. 10 In the case of RSA, unfortunately, Eve may choose her public key such that encryption is not invertible (and thus, not really "encryption" any more, since decryption is impossible). Specifically, if N is the product of two distinct odd primes P and Q, the RSA-functioll y = J;e(mod N) is invertible, if and only if e divides neither P -1 nor Q -l. 
Protected OKE
To defelld against the above attack, we Ileerl an arlditional protfction step when using RSA-based OKE variants. Alice (or whoever communicates with Bob) must prove that the function E in use is actually invertible.
If the proof fails, Bob rejects. The basic idea for such a proof is to require Alice to sign a couple of random values, using N and her secret exponent d. Bob checks the validity of these signatures, using N and the public exponent e. Lucks [15] suggested to use K such signatures, i.e., Alice had to sign K random values, and Bob had to verify K signatures. Each random value can only be signed with probability lie, and if Alice (or Eve) fails to sign any given random values, Bob rejects.
[15] also proposed a technique to save bandwidth, avoiding the transmission of K -1 of these signatures. Eve's chances to trick Bob into accepting a non-invertible encryption function are negligible.
4.3
Fixing the Exponent e = 3
In the context of this paper, N is an RSA-modulus, and for the sake of efficiency, we suggest to use e = 3 as the public exponent. 12 If Eve makes the attempt to "cheat" by using a non-invertible encryption function, this llleans choosing N' = PQ' with Q' -1 divisible by 3. Then no value £1 exists with 3d == 1 (mod Q'), and, in fact, an equivalence y = x 3 (mod N') with lcm(y, N) = 1 has either none or at least three solutions for :r. (E.g., set N' = 35 = 5 * 7: the equation 29 = :r: l (mod N') has three solutions, namely 5, 9, and 29.)
A Trade-Off between Security and Efficiency
With K 80, Protected OKE requires Bob (the smart card) to do more than 80 public-key operations. This is quite slow, even if all these operations are of the form y = :r:3(mod N). The bandwidth-saving technique uses multiplications mod N, which slows down things additionally.
In order to speed up the protocol, we propose to do only K' « K signatures. Eve's chance to convince Bob that she can decrypt mod N may then be small, but not negligible. Consider Eve having chosen a modulus N such that y = x e ( mod N) is not invertible, i.e., c > l.
• With K' signatures, and if Bob stops communication after having rejected Tb times, Eve is accepted times on the average.
• Each time her "cheated" modulus N is accepted, the number of passwords (or PINs) still possible IITI decreases from a value IITI down to -on the average. Recall that c is under Eve's control. If Eve chooses a large c, her forged modulus N is unlikely to ever be accepted. If c is small, such as c = 3, she has some chance to reduce the password-space, but only by a moderate amount, such as decreasing the password-entropy by 10g2 (3) l.6 bit. Consider, say, a random 6-digit decimal PIN. The initial entropy of such a PIN is 10g2(1000000) 20 bit. In this case, the (unlikely but possible) loss of l.6 bits of entropy may be tolerable.
How likely is the event, that Eve succeeds with her cheating, and some of the entropy of Jr is lost? We provide two examples:
• Consider K' = 5, and assume that Bob stops all communication after Tb = 5 rejections. In this case, Eve's probability of success is no more than 5/(c 5 ), i.e., even for c = 3 it is only about 2.1 %.
• With K' = 7 and Tb = 10, Eve's probability of success is less than 0.46 %, even for c = 3.
We stress that the security of the scheme against this type of attack only depends on the number K' of signatures required, and on the nUlIlbel' Tb of rejections Bob tolerates.
For most applications, K' = 5 and Tb = 5 seem to provide a reasonable compromise between security and efficiency. We stress that the event with probability 2.1 % is not "Eve succeeds in finding Jr", but only "Eve succeeds in reducing the entropy of Jr by 1.6 bit" . (a), sends t to Alice, and uses k as his session key.
Description of Modified Protocol
5 Alice rejects iff f. h:3(a'). Else, she uses the session key k' = h2 (a').
Note that the steps are numbered as their counterparts in the generic protocol. The additional "protection" steps are numbered as 1.1:.
Final Remarks and Conclusion

Communication Time +-+ Computations
We proposed a "reasonably secure" variant of RSA-based protected OKE, which improved on the original version [15] by reducing the amount of computations. The two disadvantages of this variant are:
1 the security is somewhat reduced (as quantified above), and 2 the alllount of COllllllllIlication grows.
When implementing smart card-based protocols in practice, the amount of computations dome the smartcards are not always the performance bottleneck. Sometimes, the performance is mainly determined by the amount of communication instead. In this case, we recommend to use the original RSA-based protected OKE protocol [15] , which is more secure and even more efficient under such circumstances.
On Proofs of Security
The fact that the Generic OKE protocol is provably secure, but its seemingly natural instantiation with RSA can be insecure, raises some questions about "provably secure" cyptosystems. An application based on a "provably secure" cryptosystem may nevertheless be insecure, for one or more of the following reasons:
• The application fails to enforce some of the system's envirollmental requirements. This is the case for RSA-based generic OKE.
• An assumption made to prove the scheme's security is false.
• The "proven" security does not satisfy the application's needs. Is "provable security" cryptography of no use, then'? We do not think so. Providing a proof of security for a cryptosystem forces its author
• to explicitly describe the system's environmental requirements,
• to explicitly declare the assumptions made, and • to exactly specify the what kind of "security" the scheme is supposed to provide. A "provably secure" cryptosystem tells the security architect, what she has to watch for, when implementing it. This is different from "heuristic" cryptosystems, published without a proof of security. Note that the problems of RSA-based generic OKE have been described in the same paper as OKE and its proof of security [15] , and are in fact quite obvious from the specification of the environmental requirements. On the other hand, security problems of variants of EKE, e.g. for RSA-based EKE [17] have been fonnd years after the publication of these schemes.
The Random Oracle Model
Proofs of security in the random oralce model assume that the adversary treats hash functions like random oracles. The corresponding security results, showing the infeasiblity of some attacks, are thns only valid with respect to restricted, so-called generic attacks. All currently known and practically relevant attacks against cryptographic protocols are generic. But in theory, non-generic attacks could exist. So a proof of security in the random oracle modell is good, but a proof of security in the standard model is more assuring and better. See [9] for details.
Related Work
The formal verification of the security of all kinds of cryptographic protocols has been intensively studied before. We refer the reader to [8] for a "classical" example and to [2] and references therein for more up-to-date information.
The first password protocol has been developed in 1989 [14] . Some protocols with similar goals followed. An important step has been the "Encrypted Key Exchange" (EKE) protocol from Bellovin and Merritt 1992 [6] . The core idea behind EKE is to use the secret (symmetric) key 7r to encrypt the public key E of a randomly chosen asymmetric key pair (E, D), then to use E to encrypt the randomly chosen (symmetric) session key k and finally to decrypt E( k) using D. The security of EKE depends on the fact that two parties using different values for 7r are likely to use different public keys E and E', and that knowing an asymmetric key pair (E', D') does not help to decrypt E(k). It is important for EKE protocols, that every public key is used only once.
None of the early password protocols came with a formal proof of security, and in fact, some have been shown to be insecure [1, 10, 17] . Thus, researchers started to look for provably secure protocols. The Open Key Exchange (OKE) protocol by Lucks [15] has been the first such protocol. 1:3 The approach in [15] is based on the work of Bellare and Rogaway on key exchange protocols for strong secret keys [3] . In the sequel other protocols have been proven to be secure [16, 7, 5] .
The proofs of security in [15, 7, 5] are all in the random oracle model. A proof in the standard model would be more meaningful and provide an improved security assurance. Quite recently, password protocols provably secure in the standard model have been developed. Goldreich and Lindell [11] described such a protocol and a proof of security based only Oil the assumption that trapdoor oue-way permutations exist. The protocol frolll [11] borrows techniques frolll general multi-party compntation and thus is quite impractical. Nevertheless, [11] can be seen as a theoretical break-through. Another recent protocol [13] is quite practical and provably seCIll'e ill the standard model, but it is based on the Cramer-Shoup Cryptosystem and less efficient than our protocol.
On Smartcard Programmer Interfaces
When trying to implement llew cryptographic schemes (such as OKE or other password protocols, or blinding for anonymous digital Illoney, or ... ) on smartcards with support for public-key cryptography, one may get disillusioned. Often, the interface for plain number-theoretic operations such as "given e, N, and x, compute x e mod N" or "given N, x, and :z;, compute :r:y mod N" is just missing. This is, e.g., the case for the JAVA Card 2.0 API. This has two implications:
2 Some of the pre-defined primitives may turn out to be insecure (e.g., PKCS#l v. 1.5 padding for public-key encryption). The application programmer may be locked into using an insecure scheme! Of C01ll'se, the applicatioll programmer may implement a "I3igN Hm" library 011 her own. However, this is expellsive, error-prOlle and terribly unnecessary. Also, a self-written "BigNum" library may be much less efficient than a pre-installed one, especially on a smartcard with a hardware accelerator for public-key cryptography.
Conclusion
We presented a new variant of the Protected Open Key Exchange password protocol, based on the provably secure Generic Open Key Exchange protocol. The goal is to enable secure communications using slow devices, low-entropy PINs or passwords and no PKI. A trade-off between security and efficiency allows the security architect to meet reasonabll' security requirements while outperforming other password protocols.
Notes
